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ABSTRACT: 
We live in an era of information and it is very important to 
handle the exchange of information. While sending data to an 
authorized source, we need to protect it from unauthorized sources, 
changes, and authentication. ZKP technique can be used in 
designing secure authentication systems which don’t involve any 
direct exchange of information between the claimant and the 
verifier thus preventing any possible leak of personal information. 
We propose a Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) algorithm based 
on isomorphic graphs. We suggest most of the computations 
should be carried out on user’s web browser without revealing the 
password to the server at any point of time. Instead, it will generate 
random graphs and their permutations based on the login ID and 
password. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: 
Each time an application provides authentication, some 
data (password and login) are sent from the client to the 
servers through HTTP (in most cases), though for security 
reasons they are not stored in plain text form and given to the 
servers in a readable form. For commercial software, 
developers use public key cryptographic protocols such as 
HTTPS. It sets up secure communication between the client 
and server but the login and password details are still sent.  
 The motivation for this research is to design, develop and 
implement a fast authentication model using zero-knowledge 
proof to provide added security.  
   PAPER OVERVIEW: 
Zero-Knowledge Proof is explained in Section II. In 
Section III, we explain the authentication process and in 
Section IV, we describe the protocol and discuss the various 
private key algorithm in Section V. We discuss the possible 
attacks in Section VI. We review the related work in this 
area in Section VII. We conclude the paper in Section VIII. 
II. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF: 
Canonical interactive proof systems have two parties: a 
prover and a verifier. [1] 
Zero-Knowledge Proof according to the Wikipedia 
definition1 is a method by which one party (the prover) can 
prove to the other party (the verifier) that they know a value 
x, without revealing any other information than the fact that 
they know the value x.  
      Now we are going to apply the same concept while 
authenticating users by not revealing their passwords to the 
server (the verifier) and still be able to prove that the client 
has the password. 
      In the ZKP protocol, the verifier can’t learn anything 
from the authentication process. The prover can’t cheat on 
the verifier to be someone else because of repeated 
challenge response action and the verifier can’t pretend to 
be prover to a third party because the verifier will always 
have only one value which will always be insufficient to 
find or calculate the prover’s secret. 
      We discuss different approaches/problems to implement 
zero-knowledge proof. Each of them will have different 
complexities, use different data structures and hence have 
unique properties. 
 
    CLASSICAL PROBLEMS 
 
 The two classical problems that enable zero-
knowledge proof are discrete logarithm problem (DLP)2 and 
square root problem (SRP). Both of them depends on 
generating prime numbers. 
 
 Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) 3  is an 
attractive alternative to the discrete logarithm or square root 
problem or methods such as RSA. ECC is an approach to 
public-key cryptography based on the algebraic structure of 
elliptical curves over finite fields. Also, ECC is an ideal 
candidate for the constrained devices where the major 
computational source (memory, speed) are limited. The 
majority of operations in ECC involves point multiplication. 
It becomes less accurate because of the errors while 
multiplications and in order to make them accurate, the 
points are represented using Jacobi coordinates 4 . In this 
way, we can eliminate the field inversion in the scalar 
multiplications. The principle of the optimization done 
being the point doubling happens faster than the point 
addition in Jacobi coordinates. It eliminates the need to 
                                                        
1 Wikipedia - ZKP 
2 DLP  
3 ECC 
4 Jacobi_coordinates 
 2 
calculate many multiplication inverses but it requires more 
scalar multiplications with affine coordinates. We’ll skip 
going into much details over ECC here though since it’s out 
of the scope of this paper but there has been quite an 
extensive research over it.  
 
  GRAPH ISOMORPHISM 
 
 Two graphs G1 and G2 are said to be isomorphic, if 
a one-to-one permutation or mapping exist between the set 
of vertices of G1 and the set of vertices of G2 with the 
property that if two nodes of G1 are adjacent, so are their 
images in G2. Now it’s not an easy task to develop a 
practical algorithm to find if two given graphs are 
isomorphic or not but for some simple classes of graphs 
(such as planar), there exists such efficient algorithms. 
Whereas, for hard graphs, there exist algorithms with 
exponential upper bound time. However, the nauty package 
developed by Brendan McKay5 is known to be the most 
efficient algorithm. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 Suppose there are two graphs G1 and G2 such that 
the graph G2 is generated by relabeling the vertices of graph 
G1. The permutation used will be the secret key and the 
graphs G1 and G2 will be the public key pair. Another 
random permutation will be used to generate a third graph H 
which will be sent to the verifier which will in return 
challenge the prover to provide a permutation which can 
map H back with either of the graphs G1 or G2. So the 
procedure for doing the zero-knowledge proof using graph 
isomorphism goes as: 
 
1. Given G1 and G2 such that G2 = π(G1) 
2. Prover randomly chooses a number out of {1,2} 
and call it “a”. 
3. Prover chooses a random permutation 𝜀 over Ga 
and generates another graph H where H = 𝜀(Ga). 
4. Prover sends the adjacency matrix of H to the 
verifier. 
5. Verifier in return sends a number “b” randomly 
from the set {1,2}. 
6. If a = b, the prover sends 𝜒	=	𝜀-1	to the verifier. 
7. If a =1 and b = 2, the prover sends 𝜒	 =	 𝜀-1	 o	 π	 to	the	verifier. 
8. If	a	=	2	and	b	=	1,	the	prover	sends	𝜒	=	𝜀-1	o	π-1	to	the	verifier. 
9. Verifier	checks	if	𝜒(H)	=	Gb	and	grants	access	to	the	prover. 	 There	is	a	probability	of	½	of	prover	to	be	lucky	and	get	 access	 even	 without	 having	 the	 right	 permutation	(secret	key)	and	thus	this	several	rounds	of	this	method	are	needed	 for	 the	verifier	 to	get	 completely	 convinced	with	 the	 prover’s	 identity.	 After	 ten	 rounds,	 the	confidence	level	of	the	verifier	is	approximately	99.99%.		 This	Graph	Isomorphism	based	Zero-Knowledge	protocol	definitely	has	the	three	must	properties:	1. Soundness,	 since	 the	 verifier	 follows	 the	protocol. 2. Completeness:	 since	 both	 parties	 follow	 the	protocol. 
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3. Zero	Knowledge:	since	the	verifier	doesn’t	learn	anything	 other	 than	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 proof	provided	by	the	verifier.	 
 
III. AUTHENTICATION PROCESS: 
The Classical way 6  of authenticating users is 
asking for their login and password details and sending 
these details directly to the server and the server responds to 
the request based on the validity of login details. But the 
credentials are still sent and are given to the servers in 
readable form even if they are hashed or salted. Both SSL7 
(Secure sockets layer) and TLS (Transport layer security) 
can provide the client, server and annual entity 
authentication.  
 
 Figure 1: Authentication on the web 
 
The most common usage for digital certificates is entity 
authentication when attempting to connect through a secure 
website (SSL). For high security systems, client side 
authentication8 is a must. Installing a certificate to user’s 
web browser happens rarely and is prone to risks. In the end, 
to take the full use of HTTPS and stay safe, the users should 
buy a certificate issued by a well-known certificate authority 
and then the certificate should be installed on user’s 
browser.  
 
IV. THE ZKP APPROACH FOR AUTHENTICATION: 
 
Now, with the ZKP the verifier (server) can’t be 
convinced with the login and password form, therefore, the 
ZKP approach is different from the classical approaches as 
mentioned in Section III and thus requires more extensive 
computations, bandwidth, flexible communication means. 
We tried replacing the extensive computations (like 
calculating co-prime numbers or calculating multiplication 
inverses, etc.) by choosing a NP problem and using 
asynchronous web technologies like Ajax. 
A diagram presented in Figure 2 shows our approach in 
detail. The user types her name and password but the 
password would never leave her browser unlike in the case 
the classical way of authentication. The browser uses the 
login and password details to generate a secret key 
(permutation π) and the public key pair (G1 and G2).  
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 Figure 2: ZKP Implementation on the web 
  
 
Classical Zero Knowledge Proof 
                   -- Generate private key 
                   -- Generate challenging graphs 
Send login, password Send login, graphs 
                   -- Responds to challenges. 
Receive and show an 
authentication response.  
Receive and show 
authentication  response 
  
Table 1: Compares the work of browser in classical 
and ZKP based authentication systems in web. 
 
V. PRIVATE KEY ALGORITHM: 
The private key here is the permutation π that the 
browser generates on the basis of login and password 
details. We are using one way functions over standard 
secure hashing algorithms (SHA)9 to generate corresponding 
permutations to the password. A hash function 10  is a 
mathematical operation which maps data of any size 
(password in our case) to a bit string of fixed size. As stated 
by OWASP, hash functions have the following properties: 
 
1. It’s easy and practical to compute the hash but it’s 
impossible to regenerate the only input with the 
hash value. 
2. It’s very difficult to design an input to match a 
desired output. 
 
VI. POSSIBLE ATTACKS: 
 
The implementation can be done in a few ways, either as a 
browser’s extension, as a script or as a third party website. If 
the server can’t be trusted scripting gives no benefit and 
developing an extension would be beneficial but will require 
more efforts from users. We have assumed there is no 
phishing like sign-in-seal. [2] 
Attacks on the approach include our dependence on 
different algorithms and functions used like: 
 
1. SHA-1:  
                                                        
9 Secure hash algorithm 
10 Hashing passwords - one way to security 
We are using the secure hash algorithm (SHA-1) 
which is supposed to need 280 operations for a 
phishing attack which was later brought down to 
263 operations as presented in August 2005 attack. 
 
2. Secure communication: 
We are assuming that the communication between 
user and her browser is completely secure and thus 
there are no vulnerabilities, cross site scripting, any 
malicious software, etc. 
 
3. Dictionary Attacks: 
Florencio[8] conducted a research about password 
habits. Such kind of attacks happen because of 
poor password choice by the users which are easily 
guessable or are reused at many websites.[11] 
Now, If the user’s and server’s communication is 
encrypted the only way to attack is to run a 
dictionary which can be slowed down and detected 
as proved already using captchas. 
A new protocol was developed to counter online 
dictionary attacks which suggested using account 
locking, delayed response, use of 
CAPTCHA.[12][13] 
 
4. NP Problem: 
Efficient algorithms for some classic graphs were 
proposed for determining if two graphs are 
isomorphic. However, in our approach the main 
focus is to find the permutation π and not to prove 
if two graphs are isomorphic. The generated graphs 
are completely random and none of the proposed 
algorithms can be used to find out the secret. 
 
VII. RELATED WORK: 
       
      I came across NORWAHL, a research output by Ryan 
Cheu, MIT. They developed and deployed a zero knowledge 
proof based authentication system and used discrete 
logarithms as their main problem to be used in challenge 
response action. 
      Yahoo![9] proposed a simple challenge response 
solution a long ago, which was very similar to HTTP 
Digest. Because of major possibilities of servers to 
impersonate user even after hashing password, this was 
labelled as quite insecure. 
      Encrypted Key exchange [7] (EKE) was introduced in 
1992, which takes both asymmetric and symmetric 
cryptographic results. It uses one modulo function.  
      Secure Remote password (SRP) was developed in 1997 
whose security was directly proportional to the security of 
applied one way hashing function. It was quite 
computationally expensive because eit uses two modulo 
functions. It was quite vulnerable to dictionary attacks. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK: 
      We discussed and presented a novice way of 
authenticating users in the web by using graph isomorphism 
based Zero-Knowledge Proof protocols that is sound, 
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complete and give zero knowledge to the server regarding 
user’s password. 
      We discussed how the ZKP based authentication 
protocols give non trivial benefits over the classical 
approaches. 
      We also discussed about the computations that should be 
done on user’s browser in order to improve the accuracy and 
the complexity of the process.   
       
      We plan to work more on the implementation and use 
JavaScript to implement the client side extension and use 
asynchronous web technologies along with graph 
isomorphism which would be implemented using the 
popular nauty package. The next stepts would be enabling 
easy, reusable system. 
      Further we could also implement one of the protocols 
that secures against the targeted attack described above in 
Section VI. The weakness aside, the GIZKP still stands out 
as an effective authentication system.  
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